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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SOLOMON LEE FORD, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/ Appellant 
Case No. 20060720 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
CASE STATEMENT 
Ford was serving a one-to-fifteen-year prison sentence for possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person. In his case statement, Ford asserts that the "underlying basis for [his] 
conviction is thin enough - possession of a dangerous weapon, where no functional weapon was 
ever found, let alone produced as evidence " Appellee's Brief at 6. Ford provides no record 
citation for this assertion. Therefore, the Court should disregard i t Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7).1 
1If the Court does not disregard the statement, then the State asks that it take judicial 
notice of the record from the underlying criminal case. (The State will refer to the criminal 
record as "CR," and the post-conviction record as "PCR.") The State's uncontradicted 
evidence at trial established that Ford, a convicted bank robber, walked into his girlfriend's 
apartment cleaning what looked like a shotgun barrel. Ford then pointed a small-caliber, 
chrome handgun at his girlfriend's male friend, cocked it, and told him to leave. (Ford's 
girlfriend testified that Ford asked her friend to leave and that, when Ford did, he had 
something silver in his hand.) Both witnesses also saw Ford carrying shotgun shells at this 
time. Although police never found the handgun or the shotgun barrel, there was no 
evidence to contradict the eye-witness testimony that Ford had both. Upon searching the 
Ford also asserts that he was acquitted on die assault charge and refers only to R52. 
Appellee's Brief at 10. PCR52 includes only die State's recitation diat he was convicted on die 
weapons charge, not diat Ford was acquitted on die assault charge.2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Ford asserts that the standard of review for appointing counsel undet Utah Const Art 
I, § 12, is "abuse of discretion." Appellee's Brief at 3. However, die issue is whedier the post-
conviction court properly interpreted section 12 as giving Ford the right to counsel for this post-, 
conviction appeal This Court reviews a lower court's constitutional interpretations for 
correctness. Seer t.g Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31 \ 7,153 P3d 540. 
ARGUMENT 
L THAT FORD HAS SERVED MOST OF HIS SENTENCE HAS NO 
RELEVANCE TO WHETHER TfidE KteT-CONVICTION COURT 
CORRECTLY SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION 
Ford was serving a one-to-fifteen-year sentence on his conviction for possession of a 
apartment where Ford had stayed for two days prior to threatening a man with small-caliber, 
semi-automatic handgu^ they found a holstet diat would fit £ small-caliber, seiM-autoftiatic 
handgun. They also found a red gym bag in die apartment that contained a shotgun stock 
and shotgiift shells* A police officer testified diat thfe only pieee of die shotgufi missing from 
die pieces found in die gym bag was die barrel The renter's son testified diat Ford left 
things at their apartment and brought gym bags with him. Although he could not identify 
die red gym bag as one of Ford's, he testified that it was not his, his younger brother's, or, to 
his knowledge, his mother's. Ford's girlfriend testified that Ford had carried a red gym bag 
similar to the one police found from the trunk of his car to the apartment where police 
found die red gym bag widi die shotgun parts and shells. (CR580-82 587-88, 591-92,595-
97,613-14,629-93.) 
2Again, if the Court does not disregard the statement, it should take judicial notice of 
the criminal record, which establishes that die State moved to dismiss the aggravated assault 
charge, and the trial court granted the motion (CR773-74). 
2 
firearm by a restricted person. Ford recites that he had served thirteen years of that sentence 
when, in his fourth post-conviction action, he convinced a court to set aside his conviction and 
let him out of prison. See, e.g.y Appellee's Brief at 1,14. 
To the extent Ford invites this Court to affirm based on some notion that he has served 
enough of his sentence, the law forecloses that consideration. The Board of Pardons and 
Paroles, not the judiciary, has sole authority to determine how much time Ford should serve on 
his unchallenged sentence. See, e.g., Foote v. Utah Bd of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). 
The Board concluded that Ford should serve all fifteen years. Apparendy, he did not do what 
the Board would have considered sufficient to grant him early release. This Court has no 
authority to circumvent that determination by affirming an order setting aside the conviction on 
which it was based. It may affirm only if the decision to set aside the conviction was legally 
correct For the reasons argued, it was not 
II. FORD HAS NOT CARRIED HIS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT HIS 
CLAIM IS NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED 
By its own terms, the Post-Conviction Remedies Act applies to all post-conviction 
proceedings that, like Ford's fourth post-conviction petition, were initiated after the PCRA's 
effective date. Utah Code § 78B-9-103 (2008). Further, the PCRA plainly bars Ford's claims 
and no PCRA exceptions apply. § 78B-9-106(l)(d). 
Ford does not argue the contrary. Rather, Ford argues that this action falls "squarely 
within the historical scope of the Court's constitutional [writ] authority" because it purports to 
challenge the trial court's jurisdiction to try Ford in the first place. From this, Ford concludes 
that the PCRA does not apply at all; therefore, the PCRA procedural bar rules could not bar 
3 
merits review of Ford's fourth post-conviction claims. He also appears to argue that no 
common law procedural bars apply, and, alternatively, that the Court should find "good cause" 
to forgive the procedural bars and reach his claim's merits. Appellee's Brief at 14-22. The law 
supports none of Ford's arguments. 
Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42 fflf 1748, 94 P.3d 26, refutes Ford's argument that the 
PCRA and its procedural bar rules do not apply at all, as well as his apparent assumption that 
the PCRA and constitutional post-conviction review are mutually exclusive.3 In Gardner, this 
Court held that the PCRA and its procedural bar rules apply to all post-conviction cases that, 
like Ford's fourth petition, were filed after the PCRA's effective date. The Court further held 
that it would defer to the PCRA's procedural bar exceptions that incorporated the pre-PCRA 
common law exceptions. The Court continued only that the Court's common law procedural 
bar exceptions that had not been incorporated into the PCRA retained their "constitutional 
3Ford cites three cases for the apparent proposition that the legislature may impose no 
restrictions on post-conviction review: Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), Frausto v. 
State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998), and State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,127 P.3d 682. Appellee's 
Brief at 16, 22. However, Julian and Barrettwere not PCRA cases. Julian was decided under 
pre-PCRA law. Julian, 966 P.2d at 250 (petition filed under former, pre-PCEA Utah R, Civ. 
P. 65B). See also Julian v. State, 52 P.3d 1168,1170-71 (Utah 2002) (holding that the PCRA 
did not apply to Julian's post-conviction action because he commenced it before the PCRA's 
effective date). Barrett involved the State's rule 65B extraordinary relief petition, claiming 
that a district court judge had exceeded his authority. State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,127 P.3d 
682. That case, and present rule 65B have nothing to do with collateral review of a criminal 
conviction. Id.; Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (excluding from its coverage cases governed by Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65C and, by necessary extension, the PCRA). Frausto did address a PCRA action. 
Ford asserts that this Court recognized in Frausto that "'no statute of limitations may be 
constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition."' Appellee's Brief at 22 (quoting Frausto, 966 
P.2d at 851.) He apparently relies on this language to suggest that the legislature may set no 
limits on the availability of collateral relief from a conviction. However, Ford misstates this 
as the Court's opinion: only one justice joined that reasoning. 
4 
significance." Id. at fflf 13-19.4 Thus, under Gardner, Ford may avoid the PCRA's procedural bar 
only if he can establish that an unincorporated common law exception excuses the applicable 
procedural bars. He has not done so. 
Ford appears to argue that no procedural bar applies to his fourth petition because he 
purports to challenge the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Appellee's Brief at 15-19. That 
is not the law. In Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989), this Court recognized that a 
challenge to a trial court's jurisdiction has always been permitted in a collateral proceeding. Id. 
at 1034. However, the Court also recognized that successive petitions are barred unless the 
petitioner can establish '"unusual circumstances'" or '"good cause"' to justify reaching the merits 
of claims raised in a successive petition. Id. at 1037 (citation omitted). The Court included a list 
of examples of "good cause" that would excuse the default and permit merits review in a 
successive petition. Id. Noticeably absent from that list is a challenge to a trial court's subject 
matter jurisdiction even though the Court recognized that such challenges were a traditional 
basis for habeas relief. Id.5 
ATht State acknowledges, as it must, that this Court has concluded that the judicial 
branch has state constitutional authority for post-conviction review of a criminal conviction 
under. Gardner, 2004 UT 42 fflf 17-18. The State does not agree that the Court decided 
Gardner correctly and reserves its right to challenge Gardner'in future cases. However, 
because Ford has not met his burden to establish that even the common law procedural bar 
exceptions require merits review of his fourth-petition claim, the State has chosen to argue 
the case under the existing precedent 
5Ford cites Sullivan v. Turner, 448 P.2d 907 (Utah 1968) for the proposition that "lack 
of jurisdiction precludes all procedural bars." Appellee's Brief at 18. Ford misstates Sullivan. 
At most, Sullivan stands for the proposition that a jurisdictional challenge may be raised in a 
first post-conviction petition. It does not support Ford's sweeping assertion that a 
jurisdictional challenge "precludes all procedural bars" no matter how many prior petitions 
the convicted person has filed. As explained in the text, Hurst stands for the contrary 
5 
Ford also has not established that any common law exception applies.6 Both the PCRA 
and the common law bar relief based on claims that the petitioner has litigated and lost in a prior 
proceeding, and neither recognizes any exception. § 78B-9-106(l)(d); Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 
96 f 15; 44 P.3d 626. As detailed in Appellant's Brief, Ford litigated and lost in his third petition 
the same jurisdictional challenge that he litigated and won in his fourth petition. Appellant's 
Brief at 10-12. That is, he argued in both that his beyond-a-reasonable-doubt conviction was 
illegal because a commissioner bound him over for trial on that charge. 
Ford argues that the fourth-petition jurisdictional claim differs from the third-petition 
jurisdictional claim. According to Ford, his third-petition claim "stemmed from an 
unconstitutional delegation [of judicial authority], not a violation" of his right to a preliminary 
hearing. Appellee's Brief at 20. 
However, as Ford recognizes, the substance of the action rather than the label controls. 
Appellee's Brief at 17-18 n.8. Both claims depended on the same argument that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to try him because the legislature unconstitutionally delegated to 
commissioners the authority to preside at preliminary hearings. Appellant's Brief at 10-11. The 
claim that Ford contends was new in his fourth petition depended on the same jurisdictional 
argument that Ford raised and lost in his third. Because he raised no substantively different 
proposition. 
6Both the PCRA and common law place the burden of establishing an exception on 
Ford. § 78B-9-105; Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037. 
6 
claim in his fourth-petition, it was procedurally barred. See Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037.7 
Ford also asserts that the third post-conviction court did not dispose of his jurisdictional 
challenge because it purportedly "expressly construed the pro se petition as not raising a 
jurisdictional challenge." Appellee's Brief at 19 (emphasis in Appellee's Brief). He relies on the 
third post-conviction court's conclusion that Ford's third petition did not "state" a challenge to 
the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction to try him. Id. 
Again, Ford promotes form over substance because the third post-conviction court 
resolved against Ford the basis for his fourth-petition challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction. 
In his fourth petition, Ford alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him because a 
commissioner served as the magistrate at his preliminary hearing. The third post-conviction 
court concluded in an alternative merits ruling that allowing a commissioner to preside at Ford's 
preliminary hearing was not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority.8 
7Ford takes issue with the State's argument that he was not entitled to raise his 
jurisdictional argument in successive petitions until he found a post-conviction court that 
agreed with him. According to Ford, that "is precisely what the writ of habeas corpus 
entitles him to do," relying on a footnote in Hurst Appellee's Brief at 21 n.10. However, the 
footnote to which Ford cites refers to a "commentator[cs]" "bit of relevant history 
concerning habeas corpus." Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1035 n.4. Hurst does not adopt that historical 
view that petitioners are entitled to repeated merits determinations of the same claim. As 
established in the text, Hurst stands for the contrary proposition. 
8Ford also misreads the third post-conviction court's conclusion. In the third post-
conviction action, the State acknowledged that Ford's unconstitutional-delegation claim 
appeared to be a challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction to try him (PCR64). The State 
continued, however, that Ford had established no jurisdictional defect (PCR64-65). The 
third post-conviction court concluded that the unconstitutional-delegation claim "d(id] not 
state a challenge to the [trial court's] jurisdiction to try [Ford]" (PCR54-55). In context, the 
third post-conviction court concluded that Ford had not established a jurisdictional defect, 
not that he had not attempted to raise a jurisdictional challenge. 
Ford also suggests that the State has conceded that the third- and fourth-petition 
7 
Even if the litigated-and-lost procedural bar does not apply, the could-have-been raised 
bar does. Ford argues, however, that the default should be excused under Hurst because it 
would be "fundamentally unfair" not to excuse his failure to raise the fourth-petition claim in 
his third petition. In support, he argues that this court decided Jones v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and 
Paroles, 2004 UT 53, 94 P.3d 283, between his third and fourth petitions. He alleges that Jones 
sheds new light on his unconstitutional delegation argument Therefore, according to Ford, it 
would be fundamentally unfair not to re-assess that claim in light of Jones. Appellee's Brief at 
21-22. 
However, newly decided authority will excuse the successive-petition bar only when it 
applies retroactively and would entitle the petitioner to relief. See, e.g., Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1036. 
Cf also Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983) (holding that petitioners were not entitled to 
post-conviction relief based on a new rule of law decided after their convictions became final 
on direct appeal because the new rule did not apply retroactively).9 Ford has not argued, let 
alone established that Jones applies retroactively. Further, even if Jones applied retroactively, it 
would not affect the outcome of Ford's case. Jones holds only that the unconstitutional delegation 
of judicial authority doctrine does not apply to the board of pardons because it is not a court of 
record. Jones, 2004 UT 53 ^  17. It does not hold that the probable cause determination and 
claims differed. Appellee's Brief at 20. Rather, the State consistently argued that Ford raised 
and lost in his third petition the claim that he raised in his fourth petition (PCR47-47,106-
107). The State argued only in the alternative that, if the fourth post-conviction 6ourt 
construed the claim as different from that raised in the third petition, then the claim was still 
barred as one that could have been, but was not raised in the third petition (PCR107). 
^ e PCRA inferentially incorporates this exception. Gardner, 2004 UT 42 [^14. 
8 
bindover by a court commissioner robbed the district court of jurisdiction to try Ford. 
In sum, Ford has never sustained his burden of overcoming the procedural bar under 
either the PCRA or the common law. The Court should reverse the fourth post-conviction 
court without reaching the merits of his claim. However, even if the Court were to excuse 
Ford's default, his claim fails on its merits as explain in points III and IV. 
III. THE JURY'S UNCONTESTED BEYOND-A-REASONABJLE-DOUBT 
GUILTY VERDICT IS NOT VOID BECAUSE A QUASI-JUDICIAL OFFICER 
MADE THE UNCONTESTED PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION TO 
BIND FORD OVER FOR TRIAL 
Article I, section 13 provides that "[o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate — " At the time of Ford's section 13 hearing, "magistrate," by statue, included court 
commissioners. § 77-1-3 (1993). 
According to Ford, however, the "magistrate" referred to in Article 1, section 13, must 
mean an Article VIII judge. From this, Ford argues that the unchallenged beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt jury verdict was null because a law-trained commissioner with criminal law experience 
rather than Article VIII judge made the unchallenged determination that the evidence was 
sufficient to establish probable cause that Ford committed the crime for which a jury later 
convicted him beyond a reasonable doubt Appellee's Brief at 22-34. 
In the end, Ford cites no case, and the State knows of none, where this Court or the 
court of appeals has overturned an uncontested beyond-a-reasonable-doubt guilty verdict 
because a court commissioner, a "quasi-judicial officer," made the uncontested probable-cause 
determination that resulted in binding the defendant over for trial Ford cites only State v. Ortega, 
9 
751 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1988); State v. PetHt, 93 P.2d 675 (Utah 1939); and State v. Nelson, 176 P. 860 
(Utah 1918). Appellee's Brief at 33. However, in all three cases, this Court vacated the 
convictions because the defendant had been bound over on a crime different from that on 
which the jury later convicted him. Ortega, 751 P.2d at 1139-40; Pettit, 93 P.2d at 676-77; Nelson, 
176 P. at 860-62. Ford was bound over and tried on the same crime.10 Compare State v. Marsha/I, 
2005 UT App 269U at 1 (holding that the jury verdict was valid because "Marshall received a 
preliminary hearing consistent with the charge bound over"), cert, denied, 124 P.3d 634 (2005).11 
The cases that Ford cites on section 13's history and policy contradict rather than support 
his argument that only an Article VIII judge may serve as a section 13 magistrate. That is, they 
establish that a section 13 examination and commitment by a court commissioner provided to 
10Ford cites all three for the proposition that "[w]here a defendant does not waive his 
right to have each charge against him first presented to a magistrate, and yet the State fails to 
do so, the trial court cannot obtain subject matter jurisdiction.99 Appellee's Brief at 33 (emphasis 
added). However, none of those cases actually held that a section 13 hearing and 
commitment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to trial. Further, the real defect in the preliminary 
hearings at issue was the lack of notice. That is, the evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing varied significantly from the evidence on which the jury later convicted the 
defendants. Ford has never alleged that the evidence presented at his preliminary hearing 
varied from that on which the jury later convicted him or that any unidentified variance 
prejudiced him. 
nFord states that "[t]he State concedes that ca preliminary hearing and bindover are 
"essential to a court's jurisdiction over a felony... ."' Appellee's Brief at 30. Ford's 
statement is correct However, the State never has conceded that a preliminary hearing 
before an Article VIII judge is a pre-requisite to a trial court's jurisdiction, and the argument 
here an in Appellant's Brief at 15-30 establishes otherwise. Further, the State made its 
concession in the court of appeals based on controlling court of appeals authority. 
Appellant's Brief at 22-23, citing Marshal, 2005 UT App 269U. Since the State made that 
concession, this Court has called Marshal into question. See, e.g., State v. RAinehart, 2007 UT 61 
fflf 19-20,167 P.3d 1046. RAinehart states that this Court is not bound by Marshal 2nd states 
the broad proposition that a subsequent jury verdict cures defects in the preliminary hearing. 
Id. 
10 
Ford all of the protections that section 13 afforded. 
'The fundamental purpose served by [a section 13 examination and commitment] is the 
ferreting out of groundless and improvident prosecutions. The effectuation of this primary-
purpose relieves the accused from the substantial degradation and expense incident to a modern 
criminal trial when the charges against him are unwarranted or the evidence insufficient" Ortega, 
751 R2d at 1140. See also, e.g, State v. Bricky,7UP.2d6U, 646 (Ut& Fordgotthis. The 
court commissioner heard evidence supporting the charges against Ford, found that the 
prosecution was not groundless, and bound Ford over for trial. Ford's subsequent conviction 
beyond-a-reasonable doubt substantiated that determination. The examination and commitment 
before the court commissioner shielded Ford "from the substantial degradation and expense" 
of a criminal trial on groundless charges. Cf, e.g., RAinebart, 2007 UT 61 [^20 (a jury verdict cures 
preliminary hearing defects). See also, e.g., State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 41(26,128 P.3d 1171 (same). 
The State agrees with Ford that, to effectuate section 13's purpose, the person who 
examines the evidence and commits the defendant for trial must be "neutral and detached." 
Appellee's Brief at 29. That is, a section 13 examination and commitment protects against 
prosecutorial abuses that may result from prosecutors having unsupervised power to institute 
a prosecution. By necessary extension, the person who makes that determination cannot be 
beholden to the prosecutor.12 
12That is the principle for which Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US. 443 (1971), on 
which Ford relies (Appellee's Brief at 29), stands. Coolidge involved a New Hampshire law 
that allowed the prosecuting official to serve as the magistrate who issued search warrants. 
Id. at 447. Thus, the entity investigating the defendant was the same entity that issued a 
search warrant to assist in that investigation. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court held that 
the New Hampshire statute violated Coolidge's Fourth Amendment rights because the 
11 
Again, Ford got this benefit The statutory "magistrate" who examined the evidence and 
committed Ford for trial was not the prosecutor or in any way beholden to the prosecutor. 
Rather, she was a "quasi-judicial officer]] of [a] courtQ of record," She was hired and supervised 
by the judicial branch machinery. That is, she was appointed by the Judicial Council with the 
concurrence of a majority of the Article VIII judges whom they serve. She had to comply with 
the Judicial Council's rules, and orientation and educational requirements. She was subject to 
Judicial Council performance evaluations and to Judicial counsel rules for investigations of 
complaints. She had to "comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct to the same extent as full-
time judges." § 78-3-31 (West 2004). She had no ties to the prosecuting agency. Thus, Ford was 
entitled to and got an examination and commitment by a "neutral and detached" statutory 
magistrate.13 
For the reasons argued here and in Appellant's Brief, Ford's uncontested beyond-a-
probable cause determination was not made "by a neutral and detached magistrate;" instead, it 
was made "by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferteting out crime." 
Id at 449 (emphasis added). 
13Ford insists that the court commissioner "was not a member of the judicial branch." 
Appellee's Brief at 29-30. He also asserts that the State "does not deny... that Mr. Ford's 
preliminary hearing was not conducted by a member of the judicial branch." Appellee's 
Brief at 23. As to what the State "does not deny," the State does not deny only that an 
Article VIII judge did not take on the role of magistrate at Ford's preliminary hearing. The 
State has not conceded that a court commissioner is "not a member of the judicial branch." 
Ford does not explain how a "quasi-judicial officer" who is hired and supervised exclusively 
by the judicial branch, and who is subject to all of the rules that govern die judicial branch is 
not "a member of the judicial branch." In any event, as explained in the text, the fact that a 
court commissioner is hired and controlled by the judicial branch gave to Ford all section 13 
guaranteed. It assured that he was not forced through a criminal trial on nothing more than 
the prosecuting agency's say so. Rather, he went to trial only after a "neutral and detached" 
"quasi-judicial officer" examined the evidence and found that it was sufficient to meet the 
probable cause standard necessary to commit him for trial 
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reasonable-doubt conviction is not void because a "neutral and detached" court commissioner, 
who had to be law trained and have criminal law experience, examined the evidence and 
committed Ford for trial after making the requisite and uncontested probable cause finding. 
Also for the reasons argued here and in Appellant's Brief, that is true even if the legislature 
technically violated Article VIII by allowing a "quasi-judicial officer" who is wholly controlled 
by the judicial branch to make an uncontested probable cause determination. 
IV, FORD HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT ALLOWING A COURT 
COMMISSIONER TO PRESIDE AT A PRELIMINARY HEARING IS A 
CORE JUDICIAL FUNCTION. 
Ford argues that allowing a court commissioner to serve as a section 13 magistrate is an 
unconstitutional delegation of a core judicial function. As explained in point III of this reply and 
in Appellant's Brief, even if Ford is correct, the delegation did not create a jurisdictional defect 
In any event, Ford has not rebutted the State's arguments that a hearing before and 
bindover by a magistrate is not an exercise of a core judicial function.14 Rather, this Court's clear 
authority establishes the contrary. This Court clearly held in Humphry that a magistrate who 
binds a defendant over for trial is not acting as a judge. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 467 
(Utah 1991). Because a committing magistrate is not serving as a judge, a judge does not have 
to serve as a magistrate when the magistrate binds a defendant over to stand trial. 
Ford nevertheless argues that because magistrates can issue final, appealable orders, they 
14Ford also argues that allowing commissioners to preside a preliminary hearings 
violates separation of powers. Appellee's Brief at 40-41. The separation of powers analysis 
is inextricably tied to the unconstitutional delegation argument Sa/tLake City v. Ohms, 881 
P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994). Because Ford has not established an unconstitutional delegation 
of a core judicial function, he has not established a separation of powers violation. 
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do exercise final, judicial authority. Appellee's Brief at 27-28,39. Therefore, according to Ford, 
allowing a commissioner to serve as a magistrate is an unconstitutional delegation of a core 
judicial function. 
Ford relies on State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53 (Utah 1994), to support this argument Ford is 
correct that, under Jaeger, the State may appeal a magistrate's order dismissing an information.15 
However, the Jaeger Court distinguished the Humphrey reasoning on which the State relies in this 
case, jfiz^recognized that Humphrey differentiated between magistrates and judges in that "the 
orders of judges are appealable whereas the orders of magistrates are not, as they are 
nonadjudicative." Id. at 54 n.2. However, the Court explained that when a judge serving as a 
magistrate dismisses an information, "(i]t is as though [the judge], who took off his judicial hat 
and put on his magistrate's hat to conduct the preliminary heating, removed that hat and put his 
judicial hat back on just prior to entering his judgment of dismissal and discharge." Id. 886 P.2d 
at 54 n.2. 
At best, Jaeger may stand for the proposition that, when a magistrate dismisses an 
information, she has exercised a core judicial function. (Of course, had the magistrate dismissed 
the information against Ford, he would not have complained.) However, both Jaeger and 
Humphry recognize that, when, as here, a magistrate commits the defendant to the district court 
for trial, it has not entered a final order. In that circumstance, the magistrate "ha[s] [done] 
nothing more than move the case along by issuing a routine interlocutory bind-over order, as 
was the case in Humphry and as happens following the vast majority of preliminary hearings." 
15This result follows because the State cannot refile and has no other way to challenge 
the dismissal order. Id. at 54-55. 
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Id. Because the commissioner did not enter a final adjudication when it bound Ford over for 
trial, she did not exercise a core judicial function. Compare Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850-53 (giving 
commissioners the authority to enter final adjudications is an unconstitutional delegation of 
judicial authority). 
The State also argued in its Appellant's Brief that the magistrate's bindover order did not 
constitute a core judicial function as defined by Ohms because "a district judge may review a 
commissioner's probable cause determination subsequent to a bindover, and the district judge's 
review requires no deference to the commissioner's decision." Appellant's Brief at 17-18. Ford 
responds that this argument is faulty because, according to him, a bindover order, like a search 
warrant, "is immediately enforceable, as no further judicial determination is necessary to 
bindover the accused." Appellee's Brief at 37. 
This argument flies in the face of Humphrefs plain language. There, this Court 
recognized that the bindover order merely "requires the defendant cto answer [the information] 
in the district court"' Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 465 (citation omitted, alteration in Humphrey). "At 
that point, the district court has the inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether 
its original jurisdiction has been properly invoked. In doing so, the district court need show no 
deference to the magistrate's legal conclusion." Id. at 465-66 (emphasis added). 
Further, unlike the search warrant situation at issue in State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 
1998), the judicial review occurs before the rights that the bindover is designed to protect will 
be violated A search warrant will be executed before a district judge reviews it "[OJnce armed 
with an issued warrant, law enforcement proceeds to search and seize at will" Id. at 303. 
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Although the citizen may have a later remedy upon judicial review - suppression of the illegally 
seized evidence - the rights that the warrant was designed to protect already will have been 
violated. 
By contrast, a bindover order will not be "executed" - that is, the defendant will not have 
suffered the "substantial degradation and expense" of a criminal trial - until after the district 
court reviews the order. Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 465-66. Thus, the magistrate's determination 
is subject to full, non-deferential judicial review before the rights that section 13 protects are at 
risk of being violated. 
Ford also argues that a bindover is a core judicial function within the Ohms definition 
because reviewing courts will give some deference to the magistrate's factual determinations. 
Appellee's Brief at 38. However, Ohms acknowledged that court commissioners may conduct 
"fact-finding hearings" without violating the constitutional proscription against delegating core 
judicial functions. Ohms, 881 P.2d at 852 n.17. It is the ultimate legal adjudication that Ohms 
forbids. As Humphrey demonstrates, the magistrate's legal determination that probable cause 
exists to try the defendant is fully reviewable by the district court with no deference to the 
magistrate.16 
16The State also argued that, even if the legislature unconstitutionally delegated to 
commissioners the authority to preside at preliminary hearings, the commissioner acted with 
de facto authority with in the meaning of Ohms and Thomas. Appellant's Brief at 25-28. Ford 
responds that he, like Ohms and Thomas, should get the benefit of his win. Appellee's Brief 
at 41-42. However, Ohms and Thomas established defects in their convictions. That is, 
Ohms was tried before and convicted by a commissioner who lacked the constitutional 
authority to enter final adjudications. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844. Thomas was tried and convicted 
on the strength of evidence that was seized pursuant to a search warrant that the 
commissioner lacked constitutional authority to issue. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299. However, for 
the reasons argued in points III and IV of this reply and in Appellant's Brief at 15-29, any 
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V. FORD HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY RIGHT TO STATE-
FUNDED COUNSEL TO DEFEND AGAINST THE STATE'S POST-
CONVICTION APPEAL, 
Ford does not dispute that he had no right to state-paid counsel to initiate the post-
conviction action in the district court He does not dispute that he would have had no right to 
state-paid counsel to appeal an adverse post-conviction judgment against him, He insists, 
however, that a right to counsel attached after he won in the post-conviciton court and the State 
exercised its right to appeal that decision. This is so, according to Ford, because the 
discretionary, civil post-conviction action that he initiated in the district court transformed into 
a non-discretionary, criminal or adminal-equivalent action on a state's post-conviction appeal. 
Appellee's Brief at 42-58* This rationale undergirds all of Ford's constitutional and statutory-
arguments. 
Ford cites nothing to support his theory that an actionmay start as one thing and changes 
to another based solely on the identity of the person who appeals an adverse judgment To the 
contrary, "c[a]n action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final 
determination upon appeal "' Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 104 P. 117,119 (Utah 1909) (citation 
omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). The same 
discretionary, civil action that Ford started against the State is still pending and will remain 
pending until this appeal concludes. 
Ford insists that he has a Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to state-funded counsel 
Ford's arguments misstate the law. According to Ford, the Sixth Amendment applies any time 
unconstitutional delegation in this case does not affect Ford's conviction. 
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the State attempts to use the judicial process to deprive a citizen of his liberty on the ground that 
citizen has committed a crime. He continues that the State's appeal fits this construct because, 
if it succeeds, he will go back to prison. Appellee's Brief at 44. 
The law refutes Ford's expansive reading of the Sixth Amendment Ford's Sixth 
Amendment rights, including his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, ended when he was 
convicted at trial. See, e.g., MarHne^v. CourtojAppealojCal, 528 U.S. 152,161 (2000) (the Sixth 
Amendment does not apply to appeals in the criminal case). By its plain language, the Sixth 
Amendment defines the rights seoired to an "accused" in "a criminal prosecution." Ford is not 
an "accused." The State has not charged him with a crime and does not have to prove the 
elements of any crime in this appeal. Further, as explained in Martinet which Ford has not 
acknowledged, "[t]he Sixth Amendment identifies the basic rights that the accused shall enjoy 
in 'all criminal prosecutions.' They are presented stricdy as rights that are available in preparation 
for trial and at the trial itself?' Martinez, 528 U.S at 159-60 (emphasis added). Ford is not seeking 
representation for trial or to prepare for trial. He is defending a civil post-conviction victory in 
a post-conviction appeal17 
Ford's cases do not establish that he has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at any level 
of post-conviction review. Rather, they address the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment right 
17Ford also complains that, if the State had opted to forfeit its right to appeal and 
proceed direcdy to re-try him, he "unquestionably would have had the right to paid legal 
representation." Appellee's Brief at 42. Ford is correct, but it does not foDow that he has a 
right to counsel on the post-conviction appeal Rather, if the State loses this appeal, it still 
may choose to re-try Ford. At that time, Ford again will be an "accused," the State again will 
have to prove the elements of a crime before imprisoning Ford, and, as an accused facing an 
action by the State, Ford again will have all the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
"to prepare for trial and at the trial itself." 
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to state-funded counsel and only in non-post-conviction review contexts. Ford cites Lassiterv. 
Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); and Blankenship v. 
Johnson, 118 F.3d 312 (5* Cir. 1997). Appellee's Brief at 44-46. Lassiter addressed the factors to 
apply in determining when due process requires appointing counsel for an indigent parent in a 
parental termination proceeding. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-35. In re Gau/thdd that due process 
entitles indigent juveniles to state-funded counsel in their initial commitment proceedings when 
they face what would have been a felony sentence if they were an adult In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 
29-30. Tblankenship held that the Fourteenth Amendment entitles criminal appellants to state-
funded counsel to defend against discretionary review granted to the State in the criminal appeal 
Blankenship, 118 F.3d at 317. However, none of these cases create a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel beyond the trial and, as Martinet^ establishes, no such right exists. 
Ford's Fourteenth Amendment argument fairs no better. By his own admission, he relies 
on cases that address Fourteenth Amendment rights in contexts other than collateral challenges 
to a criminal conviction. Ford's Breif at 47-48. However, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 
(1987), Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), and Halbertv. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005) govern 
the point at which a convicted person loses the Fourteenth Amendment right to state-funded 
counsel for review of his conviction. Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 32-28. 
In his Sixth Amendment argument, Ford erroneously suggests that the Finky line of cases 
establishes as the litmus test for determining when the right to counsel attaches is whether the 
matter at hand is one that is non-discretionary as to the petitioner. According to Ford, the right 
to counsel attaches because he must defend in this Court his post-conviction victory in the lower 
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court Appellee's Brief at 44-46. 
Ford misstates that authority. In Finky, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), the Supreme Court held 
that there was no right to state-funded counsel in state post-conviction review. However, it did 
not found that decision, as Ford suggests, on who was prosecuting and who was defending the 
action. Appellee's Brief at 46. Rather, it construed the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the 
right to state-funded counsel to "the first appeal of right, and no further." Id. at 555. The 
Supreme Court continued that there was no right to counsel in post-conviction review because 
it was "even further removed from the criminal trial" than' the discretionary criminal appeals 
where no right to counsel attached. Id. at 556-57. Thus, it is the proximity to the criminal trial 
that governs the Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel, not the identity of the person 
defending at specific stages.18 
Ford also relies on Utah Const Art I, §§ 7 and 12 to support his argument that he has 
18Along this same line, Ford contends that he is entitled to counsel because he is in no 
different position than the appellant in Blankenship, who had to defend against the State's 
discretionary review. Ford is wrong. Blankenship involved discretionary review in a criminal 
appeal The Fifth Circuit held only that the Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel extends 
into that review when the defendant won the criminal appeal in the intermediate court and 
the State asked for and received discretionary review by the State's high court Blankenship, 
118 F.3d at 317. To support that holding, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, c"[b]ut where the 
merits of the one and only appeal'an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of 
counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.'... In the 
instant case, Blankenship was without counsel the only time the merits of his only appeal-wait 
decided against him." Id (citation omitted, emphasis in Blankenship). Ford is not defending 
an intermediate win in his criminal appeal against discretionary review in his criminal appeal 
Ford is over a decade and multiple post-conviction petitions past his criminal appeals. Ford 
is in a vastly different position than Blankenship. The Fifth Circuit's reference to the "one 
and only appeal" makes clear that it would not have extended the right to state-funded 
counsel to a post-conviction petitioner defending his post-conviction win on his fourth post-
conviction petition in the State's post-conviction appeal 
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a state constitutional right to state-funded counsel to defend the post-conviction appeal. 
Appellee's Brief at 49-53. In his section 12 argument, Ford again broadly asserts "that whenever 
the State is attempt to regain the right to imprison on the basis of a violation of a criminal 
statute, the right to counsel attaches." Appellee's Brief at 51. The law does not support this 
broad assertion. 
Section 12 clearly does not apply because section 12 applies only in criminal proceedings. 
See Neelv. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1103 (Utah 1994). This is not a criminal proceeding. See 
previous argument in this point, Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 27-30. In fact, this Court's 
precedent to the effect that the rights section 12 guarantees only to a criminal defendant do not 
attach in parole revocation proceedings refutes Ford's argument that a proceeding becomes 
criminal within the meaning of section 12 any time that the outcome may result in 
incarceration.19 
Ford's reliance on Julian v. State, 966 R2d 249 (Utah 1998) and Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 
516 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994), is also misplaced* Appellee's Brief at 51. In fact, 
those cases undercut his argument that a post-conviction petitioner has a right to counsel under 
19Ford purports to distinguish Neel because it involved a parole grant hearing rather . 
than a parole revocation hearing. Appellee's Brief at 50. However, Neel makes clear the 
Court did not limit its conclusion to parole grant hearings. Rather, the Court tied its section 
12 analysis to its Sixth Amendment analysis. It continued that, "|I]f the Sixth Amendment 
does not guarantee the right to counsel in a parole revocation hearing, it certainly does not 
guarantee that right in an offender's initial post-revocation parole grant hearing." Neel, 886 
P.2d at 1103-1104 (emphasis added). In a later case, this Court stated categorically that 
"parole proceedings" are not criminal proceedings to which the rights that a criminal 
defendant enjoys will attach. The Court did not distinguish parole grant proceedings from 
parole revocation proceedings. Monson v Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,1030 (Utah 1996). See also 
Malek v. Friel, 2004 UtApp 237U (citing Neel for the proposition that parole revocation 
proceedings are civil; therefore, there is no right to counsel). 
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section 12. In Parsons, Justice Zimmerman opined that the distinction between the criminal 
proceedings and post-conviction review was a fiction, and that post-conviction review was an 
integral part of the criminal process. Parsons, 871 P.2d at 530-31. He would have recognized 
a right to state-funded counsel in post-conviction review. Id. However, only one justice joined 
him. Id. at 531. Even more telling, when Justice Zimmerman repeated those sentiments in 
Julian, 966 P.2d at 259, he failed to garner any votes, including that of the justice who joined him 
in Parsons. Thus, this Court has never "suggested" that post-conviction petitioners have the right 
to state-funded counsel at any level of post-conviction review.20 
^ o r d also relies on State v. Eichler, 483 P.2d 887 (Utah 1971), for the proposition that 
section 12 guarantees him state-funded counsel in this post-conviction appeal because, if he 
loses, he may return to prison. Appellee's Brief at 49-50. However, Eichler w&s not a post-
conviction proceeding or any other kind of civil appeal It was an appeal from a probation 
revocation initiated in the criminal case, where section 12, on which this Court relied, facially 
applies. Therefore, Eichler does not stand for the broad proposition for which Ford cites it 
that a section 12 right to counsel attaches in proceedings outside of the criminal process 
where a person may be returned to prison. Further, Neel, Monson, and Makk, discussed in the 
text, make clear that section 12 does not apply outside of the criminal prosecution. 
For this reason, Ford's criticism of the State for relying on Beal v. Turner, 454 P.2d 624 
(Utah 1969) is misplaced. The State cited Beal tot the proposition that Art I, § 7 due process 
does not guarantee counsel at parole revocation proceedings. Appellant's Supplemental Brief 
at 26 (citing Beal, 454 P.2d at 625). Eichler did not overrule Beal, as Ford suggests. 
Appellee's Brief at 50. Rather, as stated, Eichler was a criminal appeal and relied on section 
12, which defines the rights of criminal defendants. Beal'was a civil habeas case and 
addressed section 7 due process rights. Beal, 454 P.2d at 625. Further, Eicbkr cited to Beal, 
but did not state that it was overruling Beal. Eichler, 483 P.2d at 424 n.6. Because Eichler and 
Beal addressed different constitutional provisions in different kinds of proceedings, one 
criminal and the other civil, Eichler did not overturn Beal. In fact, those cases support the 
State's argument tliat section 12 does not apply outside of criminal proceedings. 
Admittedly, the basis for the Beal decision is unclear and, if it relied on the idea that a 
parolee has no liberty interest in his continued freedom, Neel docs overrule it See Neel, 886 
P.2datll01. See also Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 26 n/7. However, Neel nowhere 
intimates that a parolee facing possible re-incarceration has a blanket right to counsel, and 
the cases on which it relies stand for the proposition only that there may be some 
circumstances where due process requires providing counsel at a parole revocation 
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Ford's invitation to craft a section 7 due process right to state-funded counsel to defend 
post-conviction appeals also is unavailing. As explained in this point and Appellant's 
Supplemental Brief at 26, whether Ford actually has a legally cognizable liberty interest is still 
under review. 
Further, Ford's section 7 argument rests, as it did below, on little more than a bare 
assertion that the Court should create a right to counsel to defend the state post-conviction 
appeal because it would be fair. The State constitution does not provide a blank slate to write 
policy for the State. Rather, the Court's duty in discerning the rights secured by the Utah 
Constitution is to discern the people's intent American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 
40 f 12 n.3, and ffi[ 77 and 84,140 P.3d 1235 (Durrani, J., concurring).21 The people have made 
that intent manifest they have provided for state-funded counsel in death-penalty post-
conviction cases; all other petitioners are relegated to representing themselves or to 
representation by pro bono counsel Compare §§ 78B-9-109 and 202.22 
Moreover, if the state framers had intended to provide counsel to persons collaterally 
challenging a criminal conviction, they knew how to do it They specifically provided counsel 
to criminal defendants. They did not do the same for post-conviction petitioners. Thus, the 
proceedings. See Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 26 n.7. Also as argued a parolee has a 
greater liberty interest than Ford. In any event, all of the law refutes Ford's broad 
proposition a person is entitled to counsel he may be re-incarcerated. Appellee's Brief at 51. 
^Ford never even acknowledges the State's argument under American Bush or attempts 
to satisfy it pre-requisites for fashioning a state constitutional rule. 
^The State recognizes that Ford claims that the Indigent Defense Act rather than the 
PCRA applies to the counsel issue in this case. Of course, if the Court agrees, there would 
be no need to craft a state constitutional remedy, as Ford invites the Court to do. 
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Utah Constitution's plain text suggests that the framers did not consider state-funded counsel 
to be integral to defending in the appellate courts a post-conviction win in the district courts. 
See Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 30-31. 
Ford's fairness argument also is counter-intuitive. Ford concludes that it would not be 
fair to make him defend his post-conviction victory pro se. However, he has not disputed that 
he had no due process right to counsel to attain that victory in the first place. He has not 
explained why it was fair to require him to take on the burden pro se of proving his entitlement 
to post-conviction relief, but it would be unfair to require him to defend it where the burden of 
upsetting that victory has shifted to the State. His bare conclusion that this distinction exists is 
insufficient for resorting to the state constitution to overwrite the legislature's determination of 
when Ford is entitled to state-funded counsel. Cf. State v. Honie,2002 UT 4 Tf61 n.7,57 P.3d 977 
(declining to adopt a state constitutional rule where Honie had not demonstrated in "any-
meaningful fashion" why the Court should apply cited constitutional provisions to create the 
proposed rule), cert, denied, 537 U.S. S63.23 
Finally, as detailed in the Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 9-18, the IDA applies only 
to criminal cases and only to persons "under arrest" and facing a "criminal charge." Ford is not 
under arrest or facing a criminal charge. It does not apply, as Ford mischaracterizes it, merely 
because a prior conviction will result in his re-incarceration.24 
^Ford's argument that providing paid counsel would facilitate the accuracy of this 
appeal's outcome also does not justify creating a right to counsel The same could be said of 
the proceeding below, where Ford does not dispute that he had no right to counsel 
24Ford also asserts that the "criminal" characterization cannot govern the IDA's reach 
"because the IDA applies to juvenile proceedings, which are civil proceedings." Appellee's 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued here and in the State's opening briefs, the post-conviction court 
erroneously vacated Ford's uncontested beyond-a-reasonable-doubt conviction and erroneously 
appointed state-funded counsel to defend that victory on appeaL 
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Brief at 54. Ford provides no citation for his statement that the IDA applies to juvenile 
proceedings. In fact, the statement appears to be false. The Juvenile Court Act, not the 
IDA, provides for state-funded counsel to represent indigent juveniles. See In re W.B.J., 966 
R2d 295,297 and n.2 (Utah App. 1998) 
Of course, if the State loses this appeal and chose to re-try Ford, he would be entitled 
to counsel under the IDA if he is indigent 
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